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21. INTRODUCTION 
In a seminal paper, Wilson [12 J introduced the notion of fine core of an 
economy with ditTerential information. The definition of fine core presumes 
that traders can share their information. (See Vohra [lOJ for a discussion 
of this issue.) A coalition blocks if it has a feasible allocation that is 
preferred by every member of the coalition in an event which the coalition 
can jointly discern. In this paper we study the relationship between the fine 
core and the ex-post coreo 
We consider an atomless exchange economy (see Aumann [3 J) with dif-
ferential information in which the space of states of nature is finite. We 
show that under standard conditions the fine core is included in the ex-post 
coreo It is easy to construct examples to show that this inclusion may be 
proper, and that it does not hold for economies with a finite number of 
traders-see Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz [6]. 
Our proof relies on a theorem of Vind [9J that establishes that if an 
allocation is not in the core (of an atomless economies with full informa-
tion), then it can be blocked by an arbitrarily large coalition. Since in our 
framework there are only finitely many ditTerent information fields (because 
the set of states of nature is finite), and since we assume that full informa-
tion corresponds to the joint information of the traders in the economy, a 
sufficientIy large coalition can discern any state of nature. Hence alloca-
tions that do not belong to the ex-post core can be blocked by a (suf-
ficientIy large) coalition that jointIy has full information, and therefore do 
not belong to the fine coreo 
This inclusion ofthe fine core in the ex-post core has interesting consequen-
ces. In particular, it implies (together with Aumann's Core Equivalence 
Theorem) that every fine core allocation is a selection from the equilibrium 
correspondence of the associated family of full information economies. 
Moreover, when each trader knows his or her own utility function and his or 
her endowment, it implies that every fine core allocation is a rational expecta-
tions equilibrium allocation. 
Alternative concepts of core have been discussed in the literature: Wilson [12 J 
defines the coarse core, Yannelis [ 13 J introduces theprivate core, and Allen [2 J 
and Koutsougeras and Yannelis [7 J introduce the weak fine coreo More recently, 
Vohra [lOJ introduces the incentive compatible core, and Volij [11 J the inter-
naBy consistent coreo AIso the ex-ante fine and weak in fine cores are studied by 
ABen [2J, Koutsougerasand Yannelis [7J, and Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz [4]. 
2. THE MODEL 
We consider apure exchange economy éf with ditTerential information. 
The commodity space is 9\1+. The space of traders is a measure space 
3(T, L, fl), where T is a set (the set of traders), L is a a-field of subsets of 
T (the set of coalitions), and fl is a measure on Lo The space of states of 
nature is a measurable space (Q, g¡;-), where Q is a finite set and g¡;- is a field 
of subsets of Qo The information of a trader tE T is described by a 
measurable partition lI, of Qo We denote by $', the field generated by lI,o 
If W o is the true state of nature, trader t observes the member of lI, which 
contains W00 Since Q is finite there is a finite subfamily (ff¡)7=1 of ($',)'ET 
such that for every tE T there is ¡E {I, .. o, n} with $', = ff¡o For all 
i E { 1, .. o, n}, we assume that the set Ti = { t E TI$', = .'F¡} is mea su rabIe and 
fl(T;) > 00 
Every trader tE T has a probability measure q t on g¡;- which represents 
his or her prior beliefso For simplicity it is assumed that if A E g¡;- is a non-
empty set, then q t (A) > O for all tETo The preferences of a trader tE Tare 
represented by a state dependent utility function, Ut: Q X 9t /+ --> 9t such that 
for every x E 9t /+, the function u t ( o, x) is g¡;--measurableo It is also assumed 
that for every (t, x) E Tx 9t /+, the mapping (t, x) --> u,(w, x) is Lx!JB 
measurable, where w is a fixed member of Q, and :J{j is the a-field of Borel 
subsets of 9t /+ o 
An assignment is a function x: Q x T --> 9t /+ su eh that for every w E Q the 
function x( w, o) is fl-integrable on T, and for every tE T the function x( o, t) 
is g¡;--measurableo There is a fixed initial assignment e; e( w, t) represents the 
initial endowment of trader tE T in the state of nature w E Qo An allocation 
is an assignment x such that J T x( w, t) dfl :( J T e( w, t) dfl for every w E Qo 
We use the following notationso For two vectors x=(x 1 ,000,XI) and 
y = (y 1, .. o, y 1) in W we write x ;::, y when x k ;::, Yk for all k E {1, .. o, l}, x > y 
when x;::, y and x #- y, and x» y when Xk> Yk for all k E {1, .. o, l} o 
In the rest of the paper an economy g is an economy with differential 
information as it has been just describedo AIso for an economy g and a 
state of nature w E Q, we denote by g( w) the full information economy in 
which the commodity space is 9t 1+ ' the space of traders is (T, L, fl), and for 
every trader tE T the initial endowment is e( w, t) and the utility function 
is u,(w, 0)0 
30 THE FINE AND EX-POST eORES 
In this section we define the ex-post core and the fine core of an 
economy with differential information, and we show that if the space of 
traders of an economy is non-atomic (that is, the po pul atio n measure fl on 
(T, L) is non-atomic) then the fine core is a subset of the ex-post coreo 
A function u: 9t /+ --> 9t is (strictly) increasing if for all x, y E 9t /+, (x> y) 
x» y implies u(x) > u(y); and it is strictly quasi-concave if for all x, 
yE W+ and 0< ex< 1, we have u(exx + (l-ex) y) >min{ u(x), u(y)}o 
4Throughout the seetion we refer to the following eonditions. 
(A.l) For every WEQ, JTe(W, t) df.1 »0. 
(A.2) For all tE T and W E Q, the funetion ut(w, .) is eontinuous, and 
strietly inereasing on 9t/+. 
(A.3) For all tE T and W E Q, the funetion ut(w,·) is eontinuous, 
inereasing on 9t/+, and vanishes on the boundary of 9t/+. 
(A.4) ff=V7~1:fP;. 
Condition (A.l) implies that in eaeh state of nature every eommodity is 
present in the market. We use eonditions (A.2) and (A.3) alternatively; 
Condition (A3) is satisfied by neoclassieal utility funetions (e.g., Cobb-
Douglas) that do not satisfy Condition (A.2). Condition (A.4) means that 
ff eontains no superfluous events about whieh no trader has information 
and therefore eannot atTeet anyone's eonsumption deeisions. This eondition 
is essential for our main result (Theorem 3.1). It is easy to eonstruet examples 
in whieh the assertion of the theorem does not hold if (A.4) is not satisfied. 
Let faÓ be an eeonomy. An alloeation x is an ex-post core allocation of ¿j' 
if there does not exist a eoalition S E I, an assignment y, and a state of 
nature W o E Q sueh that 
(3.l) f.1(S) >0, 
(3.2) Jsy(wo,t)df.1~Jse(wo,t)df.1,and 
(3.3) ut(wo, y(wo, t)) > ut(wo, x(wo, t)) for almost all tES. 
The ex-post core of $ is the set of all ex-post eore alloeations of $. 
Given an alloeation x, if there exists S, y, and Wo sueh that (3.l )-( 3.3) 
are satisfied then we say that y is an ex-post improvement of S upon x at 
Wo' 
The ex-post eore of an eeonomy with ditTerential information and its 
relationship to the set of rational expeetations equilibria were studied by 
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz [5], who show that the ex-post eore is non-
empty under eonditions (A.l), (A.4) and either (A.2) or (A.3). 
Let $ be an eeonomy with ditTerential information. If '§ is a subfield of 
ff, f Q ..... 9t+ is an ff-measurable funetion, and tE T, we denote by 
EtUI '§) the eonditional expeetation offwith respeet to qt. For every SEI 
let 
I( S) = { i 11 ~ i ~ n, and f.1( S n TJ > O}, 
where the number n and the sets Ti are defined in the previous seetion. 
An information structure for a coalition S E ¿; is a family (~) t E s of sub-
fields of .q¡; sueh that for every subfield '§ of .q¡; the set {t E S 1 .Ye; = '§} is 
5in L. A eommunieation system for a eoalition S EL is an information struc-
ture C1t;Les for S such that for all t E S 
.?; S; dC; S; V :?F¡. 
iE/(S) 
A communication system (dC;)teS for a coa1ition S is called a full eom-
munieation system for S if for all t E S we have 
dC; = V .'l'¡. 
iE/(S) 
The aboye termino10gy is due to Wi1son [12]. A communication system 
is in fact a se heme for sharing information among the members of a coa1i-
tion. 
Let S be a coa1ition and 1et (dC;LES be a eommunication system for S. 
Since Q is finite, there is a finite subfami1y (dC;)7=1 of CYt;LES such that for 
every t E S there is 1 ~ i ~ k with dC; = Yf¡ and for all 1 ~ i ~ k 
¡.t( { t E S I .1t; = Yf¡} ) > Ü. 
An event A E/? is called eommon knowledge for S with respeet to the eom-
munieation system (.Yt;)tE S if A E /\7= 1 Yf¡. 
We now extend Wi1son's [12] definition of fine core to our model. 
An allocation x is an fine eore alloeation for an economy ¡ff if there does 
not exist a coa1ition S, an assignment y, a communication system (dC;Les 
for S, and a non-empty event A which is common know1edge for S with 
respeet to (.Yt;LES such that 
(3.4) ¡.t(S»Ü, 
(3.5) JsY(w, t) d¡.t~Jse(w, t) d¡.t, for every wEA, and 
(3.6) for all W E A and a1most all t E S 
The fine eore of an economy ¡ff is the set of all fine core allocations of ¡ff. 
If there exists S, y, (.Yt;)tES' and A such that (3.4)-(3.6) are satisfied then 
y is called a fine improvement of S upon x with respeet to the eommunieation 
system (Yf¡)tES' 
We now state and prove our resu1t. 
6THEOREM 3.1. Assume that <t is an atomless eeonomy (i.e., sueh that the 
population measure fl on (T, .E) is non-atomie) that sati~fies eonditions (A.I ), 
(AA) and either (A.2) or (A.3). Then the fine eore of <t is a subset of the 
ex-post eore of <t. 
Proof Let x be a fine core allocation of an atomless economy <t. 
Assume, contrary to our c1aim, that x is not an ex-post core allocation of 
<t. Then there exists a coalition S E.E with fl( S) > O, a state of nature 
Wo EQ, and an assignment y such that JsY(Wo, t) dfl'~Jse(wo, t)dfl, and 
ut(Wo,y(Wo,t))>ut(Wo,x(Wo,t)) for almost all tES. Define the function 
x: T --+ W+ by x( t) = x( wo, t) for all tE T. Then x is an allocation of the full 
information economy <t( wo). Moreover, x is not in the core of the economy 
<t( wo). Therefore by the Theorem of Vind [9] (see also Proposition 7.3.2 
in Mas-Colell [8]), there exists a coalition Q E.E with fl( Q) > fl( T) -
min{fl(T¡), ... ,fl(Tn )}, and an integrable function y:T--+ffi l+ such that 
JQY(t)dfl~JQe(wo,t)dfl, and u,(wo,y(t))>u,(wo,x(t)) for almost all 
tE Q. Let A( wo) be the atom of the fie1d :!F containing W o. Define a func-
tion z: Q x T --+ ffil+ by 
z(w, t) = {y(t) 
e( w, t) 
if wEA(wo), 
otherwise. 
Then z(·, t) is :!F-measurable for all tE T. Therefore z is an assignment 
in <t. We show that z is a fine improvement of Q upon x with respect to 
the full communication system for Q. Since e( w, . ) = e( wo, .) for all 
w E A(wo) (because e(·, t) is :!F-measurable for all tE T), we have 
f z(w, t) dfl ~ f e(w, t) dfl, 
Q Q 
for all w E Q. 
Now as fl( Q) > fl( T) - min {fl( T¡), ... , fl( Tn )}, we have l( Q) = { 1, ... , n}, 
and thus ViE1(Q):!F¡=.'F by (AA). Therefore A(Wo)EViE1(Q):!F¡. Since for 
all tE T the function u,(-, x(·, t)) is :!F-measurable, for all tE T we have 
E, (u,(., x(., t))! V :!F¡) = u,(., x(·, t)), 
iEI(Q) 
and 
E,(u,(.,Z(-,t))! V .~)=u,(.,Z(.,t)). 
iEI(Q) 
7Now for all WEA(wo) we have 
Et (U t(., z(·, t))! v ff';) (w) = ut(w, z(w, t)) = ut(w, Y(t)) 
iEI(Q) 
=Ut(Wo, y(t)) 
>Ut(WO, X(t)) 
= Ut(WO, X(WO, t)) = Ut(W, X(W, t)) 
=Et(Ut(.,X(.,t))! V ff';)(W). 
iEI(Q) 
Thus, z is a fine improvement of Q upon x with respect to the full com-
munication system for Q, which contradicts the fact that x is a fine core 
allocation of i!. I 
Remark 3.2. The proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that in atomless 
economies the ex-post core contains a kind of "core" in which a blocking 
coalition is limited to use its full communication system and the blocking 
assignment is assumed to be measurable with respect to the joint informa-
tion field of the member of the blocking coalition. Thus, the ex-post 
core contains this superset of the fine coreo Note that in Wilson's [12J 
Example 2, this superset is non-empty, while the fine core is empty. 
COROLLARY 3.3. Assume that i! is an atomless economy that satisfies 
conditions (A.1), (A.4) and either (A.2) or (A.3). Jf x is a fine core allocation 
of i! then for each W E Q, x( w, .) is a competitive equilibrium allocation of 
i!(w). 
Proo! Corollary 3.3 follows from Theorem 3.1 and Aumann's Core 
Equivalence Theorem; see Aumann [3 J. I 
A price system is an :F -measurable non-zero function p: Q --> 9t1+. If p is 
a price system, we denote by (J(p) the smallest subfield '§ of :F for which 
p is '§-measurable. Note that the atoms of (J(p) are the elements of the par-
tition of Q generated by the function p. The budget set of a trader tE T at 
the state of nature W E Q when the price system is p is given by 
Bt(w, p) = {a E 9t1+ Jp(w). a ~p(w). e(w, t)}. 
A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair (p, x), where pis a price system 
and x is an allocation such that 
(3.7) for almost all tE T, x(·, t) is (J(p) V ff,-measurable; 
(3.8) for every w E Q and almost all tE T, x( w, t) E Bt (w, p); and 
8(3.9) for almost all tE T, if X: Q ...... W+ is a(p) V ~-measurable and 
satisfies x(w)EBf(w,p) for all wEQ, then 
for almost all W E Q. 
This definition of rational expectations equilibrium is an adaptation of 
that of ABen [1] to our model. The foBowing corollary establishes a 
logical relation between the fine core and the set of rational expectations 
equilibrium allocations. 
COROLLARY 3.4. Assume that éf is an atomless economy that satisjies 
conditions (A.l), (A.4) an either (A.2) or (A. 3) and in addition 
(3.10) jor every tE T, e(·, t) is .~-measurable 
(3.11 ) jor every x E ffi 1+ and tE T, Uf ( " x) is ~ -measurable, and 
(3.12) jor every W E Q, uf(w, .) is strictly quasi-concave on ffil+. 
Then every fi'ne core allocation oj éf is a rational expectations equilibrium 
allocation of éf. 
Proof Corollary 3.4 is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1 and 
Theorem 4.5 in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz [5]. I 
The converse of Corollary 3.4 does not hold (see Example 3.6 In Einy, 
Moreno and Shitovitz [4]). 
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